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This essay, written around 1779, challenges the simple quantity theory of money.
From the perspective of the paper money issued to pay for America’s Revolution-
ary War—bills of credit, or continentals—the essay rejects the idea that the value
of money is determined by the number of pieces of paper issued. That idea ignores
the fact that an individual nation is just a small part of the world economy. More
relevant than quantity, the essay argues, are two other features: the date the govern-
ment promises to exchange the pieces of paper for specie and the credibility of that
promise.
This essay originally appeared in a 1791 Philadelphia newspaper. The version
reprinted in this journal is the edited and annotated version from The Papers of
James Madison (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). It is reprinted with
the permission of the University of Chicago Press.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Observations written
1 posterior to the circular Address of
Congress in Sept. 1779, and prior to their Act of March,
1780.
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It has been taken for an axiom in all our reasonings on
the subject of ﬁnance, that supposing the quantity and de-
mand of things vendible in a country to remain the same,
their price will vary according to the variation in the quan-
tity of the circulating medium; in other words, that the
value of money will be regulated by its quantity. I shall
submit to the judgment of the public some considerations
which determine mine to reject the proposition as founded
in error. Should they be deemed not absolutely conclusive,
they seem at least to shew that it is liable to too many ex-
ceptions and restrictions to be taken for granted as a fun-
damental truth.
If the circulating medium be of universal value as spe-
cie, a local increase or decrease of its quantity, will not,
whilst a communication subsists with other countries, pro-
duce a correspondent rise or fall in its value. The reason is
obvious. When a redundancy of universal money prevails
in any one country, the holders of it know their interest too
well to waste it in extravagant prices, when it would be
worth so much more to them elsewhere. When a deﬁcien-
cy happens, those who hold commodities, rather than part
with them at an undervalue in one country, would carry
themtoanother. Thevariationofprices inthesecases,can-
not therefore exceed the expence and insurance of trans-
portation.
Suppose a country totally unconnected with Europe, or
with any other country, to possess specie in the same pro-
portion to circulating property that Europe does; prices
therewouldcorrespondwiththoseinEurope.Supposethat
somuchspeciewerethrownintocirculationastomakethe
quantity exceed the proportion of Europe tenfold, without
any change in commodities, or in the demand for them: as
soon as such an augmentation had produced its effect,
prices would rise tenfold; or which is the same thing, mon-
ey would be depreciated tenfold. In this state of things,
suppose again, that a free and ready communication were
opened between this country and Europe, and that the in-
habitants of the former, were made sensible of the value of
their money in the latter; would not its value among them-
selves immediately cease to be regulated by its quantity,
and assimilate itself to the foreign value?
Mr. Hume in his discourse on the balance of trade sup-
poses, “that if four ﬁfths of all the money in Britain were
annihilated in one night, and the nation reduced to the
same condition, in this particular, as in the reigns of the
Harrys and Edwards, that the price of all labour and com-
modities would sink in proportion, and every thing be sold
as cheap as in those ages: That, again, if all the money in
Britain were multiplied ﬁvefold in one night, a contrary ef-
fect would follow.” This very ingenious writer seems not
to have considered that in the reigns of the Harrys and
Edwards, the state of prices in the circumjacent nations
corresponded with that of Britain; whereas in both of his
suppositions, it would be no less than four ﬁfths different.
Imagine that such a difference really existed, and remark
the consequence. Trade is at present carried on between
Britain and the rest of Europe, at a proﬁt of 15 or 20 per
cent. Were that proﬁt raised to 400 per cent. would not
their home market, in case of such a fall of prices, be so
exhausted by exportation—and in case of such a rise of
prices,besooverstockedwithforeigncommodities,asim-
mediately to restore the general equilibrium? Now, to bor-
row the language of the same author, “the same causes
whichwouldredresstheinequalitywereittohappen, must
forever prevent it, without some violent external opera-
tion.”
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The situation of a country connected by commercial in-
tercourse with other countries, may be compared to a sin-
gle town or province whose intercourse with other towns
and provinces results from political connection. Will it be
pretended that if the national currency were to be accumu-
lated in a single town or province, so as to exceed its due
proportion ﬁve or tenfold, a correspondent depreciation
would ensue, and every thing be sold ﬁve or ten times as
dear as in a neighboring town or province?
If the circulating medium be a municipal one, as paper
currency, still its value does not depend on its quantity. It
depends on the credit of the state issuing it, and on the
time of its redemption; and is no otherwise affected by the
quantity, than as the quantity may be supposed to endan-
ger or postpone the redemption.
That it depends in part on the credit of the issuer, no
one will deny. If the credit of the issuer, therefore be per-
fectly unsuspected, the time of redemption alone will reg-
ulate its value.
To support what is here advanced, it is sufficient to ap-
peal to the nature of paper money. It consists of bills or
notes of obligation payable in specie to the bearer, either
on demand or at a future day. Of the ﬁrst kind is the paper
currencyofBritain,andhenceitsequivalencetospecie.Of
the latter kind is the paper currency of the United States,
and hence its inferiority to specie. But if its being redeem-
able not on demand but at a future day, be the cause of its
inferiority, the distance of that day, and not its quantity,
ought to be the measure of that inferiority.
It has been shewn that the value of specie does not
ﬂuctuate according to local ﬂuctuations in its quantity.
Great Britain, in which there is such an immensity of cir-
culating paper, shews that the value of paper depends as
little on its quantity as that of specie, when the paper rep-
resents specie payable on demand. Let us suppose that the
circulating notes of Great Britain, instead of being payable
on demand, were to be redeemed at a future day, at the
end of one year for example, and that no interest was due
on them. If the same assurance prevailed that at the end of
the year they would be equivalent to specie, as now pre-
vails that they are every moment equivalent, would any
other effect result from such a change, except that the
notes would suffer a depreciation equal to one year’s in-
terest? They would in that case represent, not the nominal
sum expressed on the face of them, but the sum remaining
after a deduction of one year’s interest. But if when they
represent the full nominal sum of specie, their circulation
contributes no more to depreciate them, than the circula-
tion of the specie itself would do; does it not follow, that
if they represented a sum of specie less than the nominal
inscription, their circulation ought to depreciate them no
more than so much specie, if substituted, would depreciate
itself? We may extend the time from one, to ﬁve, or to
twenty years; but we shall ﬁnd no other rule of deprecia-
tion than the loss of the intermediate interest.
What has been here supposed with respect to Great
Britain has actually taken place in the United States. Be-ing engaged in a necessary war without specie to defray
the expence, or to support paper emissions for that pur-
pose redeemable on demand, and being at the same time
unable to borrow, no resource was left, but to emit bills of
credit to be redeemed in future. The inferiority of these
bills to specie was therefore incident to the very nature of
them. If they had been exchangeable on demand for spe-
cie, they would have been equivalent to it; as they were
not exchangeable on demand, they were inferior to it. The
degree of their inferiority must consequently be estimated
by the time of their becoming exchangeable for specie,
that is the time of their redemption.
To make it still more palpable that the value of our cur-
rency does not depend on its quantity, let us put the case,
that Congress had, during the ﬁrst year of the war, emitted
ﬁve millions of dollars to be redeemed at the end of ten
years; that, during the second year of the war, they had
emitted ten millions more, but with due security that the
whole ﬁfteen millions should be redeemed in ﬁve years;
that, during the two succeeding years, they had augmented
the emissions to one hundred millions, but from the dis-
covery of some extraordinary sources of wealth, had been
able to engage for the redemption of the whole sum in one
year: it is asked, whether the depreciation, under these
circumstances, would have increased as the quantity of
money increased—or whether on the contrary, the money
would not have risen in value, at every accession to its
quantity?
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It has indeed happened, that a progressive depreciation
of our currency has accompanied its growing quantity;
and to this is probably owing in a great measure the prev-
alence of the doctrine here opposed. When the fact how-
ever is explained, it will be found to coincide perfectly
with what has been said. Every one must have taken no-
tice that, in the emissions of Congress, no precise time has
been stipulated for their redemption, nor any speciﬁc pro-
vision made for that purpose. A general promise entitling
the bearer to so many dollars of metal as the paper bills
express, has been the only basis of their credit. Every one
therefore has been left to his own conjectures as to the
time the redemption would be fulﬁlled; and as every addi-
tion made to the quantity in circulation, would naturally
be supposed to remove to a proportionally greater distance
the redemption of the whole mass, it could not happen oth-
erwise than that every additional emission would be fol-
lowed by a further depreciation.
In like manner has the effect of a distrust of public
credit, the other source of depreciation, been erroneously
imputed to the quantity of money. The circumstances un-
der which our early emissions were made, could not but
strongly concur, with the futurity of their redemption, to
debase their value. The situation of the United States re-
sembled that of an individual engaged in an expensive un-
dertaking, carried on, for want of cash, with bonds and
notes secured on an estate to which his title was disputed;
andwhohadbesides,acombinationofenemiesemploying
every artiﬁce to disparage that security. A train of sinister
events during the early stages of the war likewise con-
tributed to increase the distrust of the public ability to ful-
ﬁlltheirengagements.Beforethedepreciationarisingfrom
this cause was removed by the success of our arms, and
our alliance with France, it had drawn so large a quantity
into circulation, that the quantity itself soon after begat a
distrust of the public disposition to fulﬁll their engage-
ments; as well as new doubts, in timid minds, concerning
the issue of the contest. From that period, this cause of
depreciation has been incessantly operating. It has ﬁrst
conduced to swell the amount of necessary emissions, and
from that very amount has derived new force and efficacy
to itself. Thus, a further discredit of our money has neces-
sarily followed the augmentation of its quantity; but every
one must perceive, that it has not been the effect of the
quantity, considered in itself, but considered as an omen of
public bankruptcy.†
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Whether the money of a country, then, be gold and sil-
ver, or paper currency, it appears that its value is not reg-
ulated by its quantity. If it be the former, its value depends
on the general proportion of gold and silver, to circulating
property throughout all countries having free inter com-
munication. If the latter, it depend[s] on the credit of the
state issuing it, and the time at which it is to become equal
to gold and silver.
Every circumstance which has been found to accelerate
the depreciation of our currency naturally resolves itself
into these general principles. The spirit of monopoly hath
affected it in no other way than by creating an artiﬁcial
scarcity of commodities wanted for public use, the conse-
quence of which has been an increase of their price, and of
the necessary emissions. Now it is this increase of emis-
sions which has been shewn to lengthen the supposed pe-
riod of their redemption, and to foster suspicions of public
credit. Monopolies destroy the natural relation between
money and commodities; but it is by raising the value of
the latter, not by debasing that of the former. Had our mon-
ey been gold or silver, the same prevalence of monopoly
would have had the same effect on prices and expendi-
tures; but these would not have had the same effect on the
value of money.
The depreciation of our money has been charged on
misconduct in the purchasing departments: but this mis-
conduct must have operated in the same manner as the
spirit of monopoly. By unnecessarily raising the price of
articles required for public use, it has swelled the amount
of necessary emissions, on which has depended the gen-
eral opinion concerning the time and the probability of
their redemption.
The same remark may be applied to the deﬁciency of
imported commodities. The deﬁciency of these commodi-
ties has raised the price of them; the rise of their price has
increased the emissions for purchasing them; and with the
increase of emissions, have increased suspicions concern-
ing their redemption.
Those who consider the quantity of money as the cri-
terionofitsvalue,computetheintrinsicdepreciationofour
currency by dividing the whole mass by the supposed nec-
essary medium ofcirculation. Thus supposing the medium
necessary for the United States to be 30,000,000 dollars,
and the circulating emissions to be 200,000,000 the intrin-
sic difference between paper and specie will be nearly as
7 for 1. If its value depends on the time of its redemption,
as hath been above maintained, the real difference will be
found to be considerably less. Suppose the period neces-
sary for its redemption to be 18 years, as seems to be un-
derstood by Congress; 100 dollars of paper 18 years hence
will be equal in value to 100 dollars of specie; for at the
end of that term, 100 dollars of specie may be demandedfor them. They must consequently at this time be equal to
as much specie as, with compound interest, will amount,
in that number of years, to 100 dollars. If the interest of
money be rated at 5 per cent. this present sum of specie
will be about 41 1-2 dollars. Admit, however the use of
money to be worth 6 per cent. about 35 dollars will then
amount in 18 years to 100. 35 dollars of specie therefore is
at this time equal to 100 of paper; that is, the man who
would exchange his specie for paper at this discount, and
lock it in his desk for 18 years, would get 6 per cent. for
his money. The proportion of 100 to 35 is less than 3 to 1.
The intrinsic depreciation of our money therefore, accord-
ing to this rule of computation, is less than 3 to 1; instead
of 7 to 1, according to the rule espoused in the circular
address,
6 or 30 or 40 to 1, according to its currency in the
market.
I shall conclude with observing, that if the preceding
principles and reasoning be just, the plan on which our do-
mestic loans have been obtained, must have operated in a
manner directly contrary to what was intended. A loan-
office certiﬁcate differs in nothing from a common bill of
credit,exceptinitshigherdenomination,andintheinterest
allowed on it; and the interest is allowed, merely as a com-
pensation to the lender, for exchanging a number of small
bills, which being easily transferable, are most convenient,
for a single one so large as not to be transferable in ordi-
nary transactions. As the certiﬁcates, however, do circulate
in many of the more considerable transactions, it may just-
ly be questioned, even on the supposition that the value of
money depended on its quantity, whether the advantage to
the public from the exchange, would justify the terms of it.
Butdismissingthisconsideration,Iaskwhethersuchloans
do in any shape, lessen the public debt, and thereby render
the discharge of it less suspected or less remote? Do they
give any new assurance that a paper dollar will be one day
equal to a silver dollar, or do they shorten the distance of
that day? Far from it: The certiﬁcates constitute a part of
the public debt no less than the bills of credit exchanged
forthem,andhaveanequalclaimtoredemptionwithinthe
general period; nay, are to be paid off long before the expi-
ration of that period, with bills of credit, which will thus
return into the general mass, to be redeemed along with it.
Were these bills, therefore, not to be taken out of circula-
tion at all, by means of the certiﬁcates, not only the ex-
pence of offices for exchanging, re-exchanging, and annu-
ally paying the interest, would be avoided; but the whole
sum of interest would be saved, which must make a formi-
dable addition to the public emissions, protract the period
of their redemption, and proportionally increase their de-
preciation. No expedient could perhaps have been devised
more preposterous and unlucky. In order to relieve public
credit sinking under the weight of an enormous debt, we
invest new expenditures. In order to raise the value of our
money, which depends on the time of its redemption, we
have recourse to a measure which removes its redemption
to a more distant day. Instead of paying off the capital to
the public creditors, we give them an enormous interest to
change the name of the bit of paper which expresses the
sum due to them; and think it a piece of dexterity in ﬁ-
nance, by emitting loan-office certiﬁcates, to elude the ne-
cessity of emitting bills of credit.
*This essay originally appeared in two parts, in the December 19 and 22, 1791,
issues of Philip Freneau’s National Gazette of Philadelphia. The version printed here
is the edited and annotated version from The Papers of James Madison, vol. 1, 16
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1The original manuscript of the essay is not known to be extant. In the Tracy W.
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the article, which John C. Payne probably copied from the newspaper version of it.
2Pledging on September 1, 1779, not to increase its $160 million of outstanding
bills of credit by more than 25 percent, and that only in case of a dire emergency, the
Continental Congress had John Jay draft a “Circular Address” to the states (adopted
September 13) exhorting them to supply enough soldiers, money, and matériel to re-
store public credit and advance the common cause. And yet, by March 18, 1780, the
gloomy situation obliged Congress to authorize the states to issue new bills of credit
and declare that the old continental issues would be redeemed at only one-fortieth of
their face value (Journals of the Continental Congress, XV, 1052–62; XVI, 262–67).
Although in the prefatory note Madison declared that he wrote his essay during the six
months intervening between these two actions by Congress, he probably could have
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Inhisbriefthird-personautobiography,writtenlongafterward,Madisonmentioned
his election to Congress on December 14, 1779, and then added that “To prepare him-
self for this service, he employed an unavoidable detention from it in making himself
acquainted with the state of Continental affairs, and particularly that of the ﬁnances
which, owing to the depreciation of the paper currency, was truly deplorable. The view
he was led to take of the evil, and its causes, was put on paper, now to be found in
several periodical publications, particularly Freneau’s National Gazette.” By “unavoid-
able detention” he most likely referred to his necessary preparations at Montpelier for
his residence in Philadelphia and the heavy snow which delayed his departure for that
city until March 6, 1780, or for some days after he had planned to begin the trip. The
essay was printed as the fourth in Madison’s series of seventeen politically tinged arti-
cles appearing in Freneau’s newspaper late in President Washington’s ﬁrst term. Even
though Madison may have revised his original manuscript before releasing it for pub-
lication, it deals with a problem which was much less acute by 1791 than when he
wrote the essay nearly twelve years earlier.
3Madison accurately reﬂects the thought, but does not always quote the exact
words, of David Hume in his Political Discourses (Edinburgh, 1752), pp. 82–83.
4The portion of the essay in the issue of the National Gazette for December 19,
1791, ends here. The remainder is in the issue of December 22, 1791.
†As the depreciation of our money has been ascribed to a wrong cause, so, it may
be remarked, have effects been ascribed to the depreciation, which result from other
causes. Money is the instrument by which men’s wants are supplied, and many who
possess it will part with it for that purpose, who would not gratify themselves at the
expence of their visible property. Many also may acquire it, who have no visible prop-
erty. By increasing the quantity of money therefore, you both increase the means of
spending, and stimulate the desire to spend; and if the objects desired do not increase
in proportion, their price must rise from the inﬂuence of the greater demand for them.
Should the objects in demand happen, at the same juncture, as in the United States, to
become scarcer, their prices must rise in a double proportion.
It is by this inﬂuence of an augmentation of money on demand, that we ought to
account for that proportional level of money, in all countries, which Mr. Hume attri-
butes to its direct inﬂuence on prices. When an augmentation of the national coin takes
place, it may be supposed either, 1. not to augment demand at all; or, 2. to augment it
so gradually that a proportional increase of industry will supply the objects of it; or, 3.
to augment it so rapidly that the domestic market may prove inadequate, whilst the
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market to satisfy the demand would be supplied from such countries as might afford
the articles in demand; and the money would thus be drained off, till that and the de-
mand excited by it, should fall to a proper level, and a balance be thereby restored be-
tween exports and imports.
The principle on which Mr. Hume’s theory, and that of Montesquieu’s before him,
is founded, is manifestly erroneous. He considers the money in every country as the
representative of the whole circulating property and industry in the country; and thence
concludes, that every variation in its quantity must increase or lessen the portion which
represents the same portion of property and labor. The error lies in supposing, that be-
cause money serves to measure the value of all things, it represents and is equal in val-
ue to all things. The circulating property in every country, according to its market rate,
far exceeds the amount of its money. At Athens oxen, at Rome sheep, were once used
as a measure of the value of other things. It will hardly be supposed, they were there-
fore equal in value to all other things.
5Madison’s entire footnote is in italics in the National Gazette. In the last para-
graph of the footnote, he refers to Book XXII of Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des lois,
ﬁrstpublishedinGenevain1748andsoonthereaftertranslatedintoEnglish.Madison’s
daring in challenging the correctness of this redoubtable authority is noted by Paul
Merrill Spurlin in his Montesquieu in America, 1760–1801 (Baton Rogue, La., 1940),
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